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The debt neutrality hypothesis which has been a source of major controversies in 
the theory of public finance, and macroeconomics has at the same time generated a vast 
literature on the implications of budgetary deficits and public debt on various sub-
sectors/variables of the economy, such as inflation, interest rates, current account deficit, 
etc. Tax discounting has been one of the fields of research associated with debt 
neutrality. The econometric estimation of some of the standard models of tax-
discounting has shown that consumer response to fiscal policy in Pakistan reflects 
neither the extreme Barro-like rational anticipation of future tax liabilities nor the 
Buchanan-type extreme fiscal myopia. It broadly follows a middle path between these 
extremes. 
The controversy relating to debt neutrality is quite old in economic theory. 
However, due to its serious and far-reaching implications for the formulation of fiscal 
policy and macroeconomic management, the issues of debt neutrality have assumed a 
foremost position in economic theoretisation and empirical testing. This controversy is 
based on two important questions: 
  (a)  Who bears the burden of the debt? 
  (b)  Should debt be used to finance public expenditure? 
The first question centres on whether the debt can be shifted forward in time, 
while the second question explores whether taxation is equivalent to debt in its effects on 
the national economy.  
Since issuance of debt implies that either the debt must be re-paid in the future or 
the interest on the debt must be paid in perpetuity, the tax-payers have a liability in the 
form of future tax payment, which has a value just equal to the present value of the 
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government bond sold in the market. The creation of the asset of bonds is just offset by 
the creation of the liability of future taxes. 
The issue of debt neutrality has been brought into the limelight with the 
publication of Barro’s (1974) seminal article in which he advanced the hypothesis that 
taxation and debt are equivalent, and this equivalence was established by developing a 
model of intergenerational transfers. In his numerous papers and writings, which have 
been published continuously since 1974, Barro (1976, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1987, 1989) 
has focused on establishing the viability and rationality of debt neutrality, using both 
theoretical framework and empirical estimates. 
The major opposition to Barro’s hypothesis has come from Buchanan, who has 
postulated that fiscal illusion creates a wedge in the equivalence of taxation and debt. He 
has asserted that while bond assets are fully capitalised by the buyers, tax-payers 
invariably fail to take full account of the future tax liability at the time of debt issue. 
Consequently, the bonds are perceived by the bond-holders as net addition to wealth 
which raises the level of present consumption. This reduces present investment and thus 
lowers the stock of capital for the future generations.  
The debt neutrality hypothesis has been a catalyst of vast research, both 
theoretical and empirical, on the relationship between debt accumulation and various 
sub-sectors/parameters of the economy such as interest rate, inflation rate, budget deficit, 
and current account deficit, etc. The precise determination of tax discounting is an 
important development in the field of economic research relating to the debt neutrality 
controversies. 
A synthesis of the literature on conflicting hypothesis and divergent empirical 
tests related to debt neutrality, or Ricardian Equivalence Hypethesis, is given in Buiter 
and Tobin (1979), Tobin (1980), Bernheim (1987), Kazmi (1991, 1992, 1994), and 
Seater (1993). 
The basic argument advanced by the exponents of debt neutrality hypothesis, i.e., 
taxation and debt are equivalent, is based upon a model of intergenerational linkages 
suggesting that substituting one dollar of debt for one dollar of taxation will increase 
saving by one dollar in order to offset the future tax liabilities. On the other hand, the 
opponents of the neutrality hypothesis base their case on the argument that bond-holders 
suffer from “myopia”, and as such future tax liability will not be capitalised and  the 
substitution of one dollar of debt for one dollar of taxation will not cause saving to 
increase by the amount of the newly issued debt. 
 
THE HOLCOMBE, JACKSON AND ZARDKOOHI MODEL 
Even though a comprehensive review of the literature is not possible, among the 
important studies on debt neutrality which have primarily focused on tax-discounting in 
developed countries are Kochin (1974), Koskela and Viren (1983), Seater (1982, 1985), 
Tanner (1979), Yawitz and Meyer (1976), Feldstein (1982), etc. Studies on estimation of Econometric Estimation of Tax-discounting  1069
tax-discounting for developing countries are rather limited. However, the results of 
empirical tests conducted for a developing economy like Pakistan are presented in 
Kazmi (1991). These results generally fail to find support for the Barro’s ultra-rationality 
embodied in the Ricardian Equivalence Hypothesis. 
The empirical work on estimating tax-discounting for the US was initiated by 
Holcombe, Jackson, and Zardkoohi (1981) in their model of personal saving function 
which has the following specification: 
S = a0+al Yp + a2 Yt + a3 La + a4 R + a5 P 
+ a6 Pc + a7 U + a8dU   . . .  . . .  . . .  (1) 
When   S  =  real per capita personal savings. 
   Yp  =  real per capita temporary income. 
   Yt  =  real per capita temporary income, i.e., actual Y (income) minus Yp. 
   R  =  nominal interest rate (Aas Moody’s yield). 
   P  =  actual inflation rate. 
   Pe  =  expected inflation rate = P – PE. 
   La  =  real per capita liquid assets. 
   U = unemployment  rate. 
   du  =  change in unemployment rate. 
The regression model of Holcombe et al. (1981) is based on the revised version of the 
Howard model which assumes the form: 
S = b0 + b1 Yp + b2 Yt + b3G + b4D + 5 La + b6R + b7P + 
   8 Pe + b9U + b10 dU   . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  (2) 
The additional terms employed in the model are: 
 G   =  real per capita government spending. 
 D   =  real per capita domestic debt. 
 W   =  dummy variable for the World War II. 
In this model, the measure of transitory income, Yt, is obtained by subtracting 
permanent income from the actual. The coefficient b2 in Equation (1) is expected to 
have a positive sign on the premise that an increase in transitory income leads to an 
increase in savings. The measure of liquid assets, La, is defined by the authors as real per 
capita value of personal sector’s holding at the beginning of the period, net liquid assets, 
which consist of holding of cash, demand deposits, time deposits, saving and association 
loan shares, and saving bonds. The variable, La is included in the model on the 
assumption that the household’s stock of net liquid assets may influence its short-run 
saving behaviour separately from its role as a component of household wealth. 
Holcombe et al. have supported the Howard premise that ‘a certain amount of liquid 
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sufficiently from the desired amount, saving will be adjusted in order to restore holdings 
to the desired level’. Interest rate, R, is included in saving functions to measure the 
interest elasticity of personal savings, while P and Pe capture the effects of actual and 
expected inflation, respectively. The variables U and dU capture the effects of the 
unemployment rate and its yearly change. The variable, dU, is included as a proxy for 
expectations concerning the future unemployment rate.  
Holcombe et al. hypothesise the following signs for the variables: 
dS/dLa <0; dS/dr ≤   ≥    0; 
ds/Sp <0; dS/dPe  ≤   ≥     0; dS/du  ≤   ≥    0 
dS/du >0. 
Estimation of Tax Discounting for the US 
This model was estimated by OLS for the US using annual data of 48 years for 
the period 1929–76. The results of this model are given in Table 1, Column 1. Holcombe 
et al. (1981) however, realising that because of the relatively large number of 
insignificant variables and theoretically invalid sign on Yp (which showed the presence 
of multicollinearity), estimated a revised model in which the variables R (the nominal 
interest rate) Pe (expected inflation rate), and U (unemployment rate) were dropped due 
to their statistical insignificance. The modified model, which was used to estimate the 
impact of public debt on private saving, led to a new version of the tax-discounting 
model, the results of which are given in Equation (2) of Table 1. 
As the results indicate, except for the coefficient sign of the liquid asset, all other 
signs are in accord with the expectations. According to Holcombe et al., “one 
conceivable explanation for the positive sign on the liquid asset could be the fact that the 
data is yearly. (Howard used quarterly data and obtained a negative sign.) In the 
aggregate for the year, the impact of an adjustment process between variations in liquid 
assets and savings could have been obscured. In other words, the choice of yearly data 
for investigating the impact of the liquid asset variable on the saving variable could be 
inappropriate, resulting in a positive sign”. 
In the model, the critical variable, however, is D, the real per capita debt. In 
Equation (2) the coefficient on public debt equals 0.2, which is statistically greater than 
zero and statistically less than one at the 0.0001 level of significance. This implies that 
for a one dollar increase in the public debt, savings increase by twenty cents. In other 
words, the results indicate that 20 percent of additional public debt is capitalised in terms 
of saving and the remaining portion is not capitalised, implying that 80 percent of the 
burden of the national debt is passed on to the future “generations”. Since such an 
overwhelmingly large percentage of the future tax liability associated with the national 
debt is not capitalised, the authors conclude that the empirical results suggest “the 
dominance  of  the  hypothesis that  taxation and debt are not equivalent means of public Table 1 
U.S. Personal Saving Functions Tax-discounting in U.S. 1929–1976 
(OLS Estimation) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
C  –12.72 –39.19  –51.96 –83.25 
  (–0.16) (–2.87)  (–0.70) (–3.35) 
Yp  –0.10 –  –0.07 – 
  (–2.16)   (–1.74)  
Yt  0.76 0.42  0.97 0.46 
  (4.33) (6.15)  (3.65) (3.24) 
G  0.22 0.07  0.40 0.30 
  (3.48) (2.78)  (4.80) (3.81) 
D  0.11 0.20 –0.05 0.04 
  (1.73) (4.71) (–0.72) (0.60) 
T –  –  –0.66  –0.40 
     (–3.85)  (–3.05) 
P 944.15  78.68  1117.4  1008.8 
  (3.97) (2.34)  (4.91) (5.61) 
Pe –82.72  –  –520.6  – 
  (–0.20)   (–1.39)  
La  0.04 0.03  0.06 0.03 
  (3.77) (4.19)  (4.71) (4.61) 
U –  –  –382.5  – 
     (–1.06)   
dU 1066.87  806.66  1298.8  946.61 
  (2.32) (3.55)  (2.43) (2.26) 
R 759.02  –  3389.7  – 
  (0.55)   (2.35)  
W 35.71  0.07  13.11  18.39 
  (0.93) (2.78)  (0.36) (0.49) 
R2 0.97  0.97  0.978  0.973 
W  2.13 2.29  1.70 1.96 
F  98.92 185.53  108.84 145.64 
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finance. Substituting debt for tax finance shifts much of the burden of public 
expenditures forward in time through lower rates of saving and capital accumulation”. 
The authors place high confidence in this equation as most of the variables in this 
equation have expected signs and are significant at the 0.01 level. The coefficient on 
government expenditures, G, is positive, indicating that an increase in G leads to an 
increase in income, which in turn leads to an increase in savings. The coefficient on the 
dummy variable, W, is positive, implying that during World War II “forced saving” 
resulted in an overall savings in the United States: $78 per year per person in 1972 
prices. According to the authors, the positive coefficient on dU implies that an increase 
in expected unemployment rate leads to an increase in savings. In other words, in good 
times people save for their expected bad times. The coefficient on the transitory income 
is less than one and is positive, implying that a one dollar increase in the unexpected 
income increases savings as well as consumption. The empirical results indicate that for 
each dollar of transitory income, savings increase by about 42 cents, and thus 
consumption increases by 58 cents. 
 
Carmichael’s Critique 
After critically examining the Holcombe, Jackson and Zardkoohi model of debt 
neutrality, Carmichael (1982) has highlighted a serious shortcoming of the model as a 
tool of measuring tax-discounting. 
He has suggested that to interpret the coefficients in an equation such as (2) 
above correctly in terms of the hypotheses in question, it is essential to bear in mind 
exactly what those hypotheses are claiming. Barro’s equivalence hypothesis claims that a 
one dollar swap of debt for taxes, with the level of government spending held constant, 
will have no real effects on the economy. That is, since the debt raises the stock of new 
assets by one dollar, the demand for those assets (i.e., savings) must also increase by one 
dollar in order to leave the demand for capital unchanged. Therefore, the correct 


















where T is total taxes. Carmichael has pointed out that it is the second term of the left-
hand side of this equation that is ignored by the authors and others who have 
investigated this issue. “It is insufficient to look at the debt coefficient in isolation, since 
the hypothesis involves substituting a dollar of debt for a dollar of tax; lower taxes mean 
higher savings through an increase in disposable income”. 
Since the tax effect in Equation (2) comes through the transitory income term, a 
once-for-all swap of debt for tax will lower taxes in the current period only, so that Econometric Estimation of Tax-discounting  1073
transitory disposable income is increased in the current period. From Equation (2) the 
response dS/dT  =  –0.42 so that dS/dD – dS/dT  =  0.62. Barro’s equivalence theory is 
then tested by comparing this combined coefficient with unity. The t value for this 
hypothesis is 3.45, which rejects Barro’s complete discounting argument, although the 
degree of discounting is well above the 20 percent figure quoted by Helcombe et al. 
(1981). 
It is further claimed by Carmichael that the estimated degree of discounting, 
calculated on the above basis, is 87 percent, and in this case the data are unable to reject 
the hypothesis that dS/dD – dS/dT = 1, the t value for this hypothesis is 0.565. “Since the 
preference for (2) over (1) is in part arbitrary, the results cannot be viewed as strongly 
supportive of Barro’s position, or as rejecting it conclusively. At the same time, 
however, conclusions based only on considerations of the coefficient on debt seriously 
under-estimate the degree to which debt is discounted into savings”. 
 
The Revised Holcombe, Jackson and 
   Zardkoohi Model 
In the light of Charmichael’s criticism, Holcombe et al. (1982) revised their 
model and developed the underlying logic of tax-discounting through Equations (3) to 
(6) below: 
 
S = S (D, T, G, Zi), i = 4....n  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  (3) 
 
 Where  D is public debt, T is taxes, G is government spending, and Zi is a vector 
of monetary, demographic, and other variables. 
 
dS =  ∂S/ ∂D  .  dS +   ∂S/  ∂T  .  dT +    ∂S/  ∂G  . 
  dG +    ∂S/  ∂Z  .  dZ  . . .  . . .  . . .  . . .  (4) 
 
Holding Zi constant, 
 
dS =  ∂S/  ∂D  .  dS +  ∂S/  ∂T  .  dT +  ∂S/  ∂G  .  dG . . .  . . .  (5) 
 
Equation (5) can be manipulated to measure the extent to which debt increases 
are capitalised into savings. Holding government spending constant (dG = 0) and 
replacing a given amount of taxes with an equal amount of debt [dD = –dT], what is the 
effect on private savings (i.e., what is dS/dD)? The relevant substitutions into (5) 
generate the following tax-discounting measure: 
 
  dS / dD =   ∂S /  ∂D  –  ∂S /  ∂T  ... ... ... ...  (6) Aqdas Ali Kazmi  1074
From Equation (6) it can be seen that if the coefficient of taxes (T) in the saving 
function is negative and significant, then the sum of tax (T) and debt (D) coefficient 
would determine the extent of tax-discounting. If dS/dD = 0, Buchanan’s pure fiscal 
illusion prevails and if dS/dD = 1, Barro’s equivalence hypothesis is verified. The values 
between zero and one indicate the exact extent of tax-discounting. 
The revised equations are estimated by the authors and the results are produced in 
Table 1 in Equations (3) and (4). The tax-discounting for US now comes to 0.61 and 
0.44, respectively. 
 
Estimation of Tax Discounting for Pakistan 
From the above discussion, it is well-established that the strong version of 
Barro’s equivalence hypothesis claims that future tax liabilities implicit in debt issue are 
fully discounted, such that a one dollar swap of debt for taxes with the level of 
government spending held constant has no real effect on the economy. The obvious 
implication of debt-neutrality is that since the debt raises the stock of new assets by one 
dollar, the demand for those assets (i.e., savings) must also increase by one dollar in 
order to leave the demand for capital unchanged. This dollar increase in private savings 
in response to a dollar increase in public debt represents complete or 100 percent tax-
discounting (or debt-capitalisation) which is assumed in Barro’s theoretical model. 
The following basic model of private savings was estimated to quantify the extent 
of tax-discounting for Pakistan: 
 
Ps  =  b0 + b1Yp + b2Yt + b3G + b4T + b5D + 
  b6P + b7Pc + b8La + b9U + v 
 
Where  Ps  =  Private real savings per capita. 
 Yp  =  Permanent income, i.e., the three year average of the current year income 
and the post two years. 
 Yt  =  Temporary income, i.e., actual Y (income) minus Yp. 
 G  = Government  spending. 
 T   =  Taxes. 
   D  =  Flow of debt, i.e., the net debt accumulated.  
   Pe  =  Expected inflation: the three year average of current inflation rate and the 
past two years’ inflation rate. 
   P  =  Actual inflation rate. 
   La  = Liquid  assets. 
   U  = Unemployment  rate. 
   v = Error  term. Econometric Estimation of Tax-discounting  1075
The estimates of the model are given in Table 2 and the values of tax-discounting 
co-efficient based on the equation of this table are given in Table 3 below. 
 
Table 2 
Pakistan Private Saving Functions: Tax-discounting in Pakistan: 
1960–88 (OLS Estimation) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
C  –2.052  –12.73 –8.941 0.816 5.705 
  (–0.118) (–0.913) (–0.543)  (0.055)  (0.381) 
Yp  0.034 0.051 0.033 0.05  0.05 
  (0.471) (0.890) (0.457) (0.894) (0.780) 
Yt  0.223  – – 0.219  0.415 
 (1.378)  –  –  (1.438)  (1.914) 
G  0.087 0.073 0.118 0.117 0.048 
  (0.529) (0.478) (0.640) (0.857) (0.260) 
D  0.485 0.51  0.551 0.465 0.668 
  (1.721) (2.295) (2.263) (1.780) (2.990) 
T  0.137 0.045  –0.010 0.146 0.219 
  (0.375) (0.137) (0.029) (0.478) (0.576) 
P  –32.123 –  –  –57.564 – 
  (–0.348) –  –  (–1.489) – 
Pe  –54.245  – – – – 
  (–1.088)  – – – – 
La  0.063 0.111 0.106 –  – 
  (0.366) (1.098) (1.021)  –  – 
dU  –  – –295.165  – –481.527 
 –  –  (–.455)  –  (–0.608) 
R2  0.811 0.814 0.797 0.828 0.813 
D.W.  1.808 1.942 2.027 1.826 1.991 
F  15.515 23.221  8.689 22.677 20.591 
 
Table 3 
Pakistan: Quantification of Tax-discounting 
Equation  Extent of Tax-discounting 
    II.1  0.485 
    II.2  0.510 
    II.3  0.551 
    II.4  0.465 
    II.5  0.668 Aqdas Ali Kazmi  1076
Limitations and Critique 
The model used in this paper and the results achieved are subject to numerous 
caveats and thus limit its usefulness in a number of ways. 
We have estimated a traditional model of private savings which has been 
designed to measure the tax-discounting in Pakistan. However, we have not tested the 
sensivity of this model by using econometric techniques other than OLS estimation. 
Considering the multiplicity of variables from the fiscal side such as taxes, 
government spending, and public debt, the multicollinearity problem is reflected in low 
t-statistics for the variables of tax and government spending. Similarly, the 
multicollinearity problems is also visible in the variable of permanent income (Yp) and 
temporary income (Yt). 
Notwithstanding all these limitations, it could be pointed out that in the traditional 
model the value of tax-discounting is fairly stable in the range of 0.465 to 0.668, leading 
to the conclusion that the consumers in a developing country like Pakistan do not suffer 
from “pure fiscal illusion” but, at the same time, they do not have the ultra-rationality 
and perfect foresight for full tax-discounting as postulated in Barro’s model. 
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